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ARGUMENT 
I. Once Firkins and Walter Shook Hands, a Contract was formed 
Contrary to the arguments raised in the Appellee's brief, there was 
insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that a contract did not exist between 
Walter and Firkins because at the time of formation, the parties agreed to the 
terms. Once Firkins and Walter shook hands there was a meeting of the minds and 
a contract was formed. It is only several years later that Firkins is unable to recall 
the purchase price; a purchase price that was reached by agreement. 
"The issue of whether an oral contract or agreement exists presents questions 
of both law and fact." Flake v. Flake (In re Estate of Flake), 2003 UT 17,127, 71 
P.3d 589; see also Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100, f 17, 989 
P.2d 1077. "In determining whether the parties created an enforceable contract, a 
court should consider all preliminary negotiations, offers, and counteroffers and 
interpret the various expressions of the parties for the purpose of deciding whether 
the parties reached agreement on complete and definite terms." Flake, 2003 UT 17, 
If 28. Firkins and Walter agreed to complete and definite terms, however, Firkins 
is unable to recall the terms years later when his claim to title is challenged. 
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Firkins and Walter negotiated and reached an agreement with regards to the 
purchase and sale of the vehicles, thus forming a contract. Firkins initially though 
the asking price was too high and told Walter to give him a call when he felt "real 
about it." (Record 335, Bench Trial Transcript, p. 21,11. 8-14). This shows that 
the parties discussed and negotiated a purchase price, however, six years later 
Firkins has trouble recalling the purchase price. Firkins was unable to recall the 
exact purchase price, but recalled the purchase price was between $50,000 to 
$60,000. (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 22,11. 5-8). At first, Firkins 
denied the initial offer to purchase the inventory and vehicles, and when Walter 
extended another offer, Firkins accepted. (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 
21,11. 8-14). Eventually, Walter accepted the offer from Firkins to purchase the 
items, and the agreement was not reduced to writing, as part of the agreement 
between the parties. (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 22,11. 1-16). Walter 
desired to hide assets and money from his ex-wife, therefore, this was a term of the 
oral contract: the payments were to be in cash and the agreement was to be off the 
books. (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 22,11. 19-25). Therefore, the 
preliminary negotiations, the initial offer and thefKthe subsequent offer and 
acceptance show that Firkins and Walter expressed the desire and willingness to 
negotiate an agreement of complete and definite terms. They agreed to a purchase 
price, Walter turned over the vehicles, and later signed title over to Walter. Firkins 
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never testified that a price was not reached, only that he could not recall the price. 
Therefore, the present case is different from Carter v. Sorenson, where a contract 
was found unenforceable because the parties did not agree on a price. Carter v. 
Sorensen, 2004 UT 33,16, 90 P.3d 637. 
II. Firkins did not Default on the Contract that was Formed 
Once the contract was formed, Firkins made payments to Walter when 
demanded and Firkins held title for several years. Although Appellee asserts that 
Firkins did not pay or perform under the contract, Walter decided not to involve 
himself in the present action and did not offer any evidence or testimony as to the 
fact that Firkins did not complete the terms of the contract. Furthermore, Walter 
never filed any action against Firkins for non payment, nor did he insist on being a 
lien holder on any issued title. Even when Walter had the Utah titles in his 
possession with Firkins' name on them, he did not challenge Firkins as the title 
holder. The parties that contracted, Walter and Firkins, have no legal dispute over 
payment of money or any balance due. 
The disadvantage that Firkins faces is that he made payments to Walter in 
cash, to keep the agreement hidden from Walter's ex-wife. Firkins agreed to pay 
for the vehicles at the end of the Olympics, that the payments were to be in cash, 
and the agreement was to be "off the books." (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, 
p. 46 - p. 54). For several years, Firkins made cash payments to Walter. At trial, 
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Firkins testified to the payments he made to Walter. (Record 335; Bench Trial 
Transcript, p. 46 - p. 54). Firkins testified that he only started to keep track of his 
payments starting in October of 2004 because "of tenuous nature of Mr. Walter's 
behavior." (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 53 11. 17 - p. 54 11. 9). Firkins 
also testified that sometimes he paid Walter's rent. (Record 335; Bench Trial 
Transcript, p. 54,11. 6-10). Firkins stopped making payments when he believed he 
had paid more than enough for the vehicles, because Walter did not keep accurate 
records of what was owed. (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 54,11. 13 - 19). 
In the present case, the contract was clear enough for the parties to perform. 
Firkins took the vehicles from Walter's possession, and Walter relinquished 
possession of the vehicles. Walter signed necessary documents to transfer title to 
Firkins. Walter also accepted payment from Firkins for several years. Therefore, 
the contract was not so uncertain or indefinite that the intentions of the parties 
cannot be ascertained. The parties' behavior supports that a binding contract 
existed, even though both did not keep accurate records of payments. The parties 
do not dispute if money is owed, thus, a valid contract was formed between the 
parties, and Firkins performed under the contract. 
Firkins' actions show that he relied upon the oral agreement. Over the 
course of several years, Firkins made cash payments to Walter when demanded. 
This performance by Firkins results in an enforceable contract. Partial 
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performance of an oral contract can only result in enforcement of the contract if 
"(1) the oral contract and its terms are clear and definite, (2) the acts done in 
performing the contract are equally clear and definite, and (3) the acts are in 
substantial reliance on the oral contract." Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 801 
(Utah 1998); see Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983). Firkins agreed 
to a purchase price, and relying upon their agreement, made cash payments to 
Walter. There is no other reason why Firkins would make substantial cash 
payments to Walter besides fulfilling his duty under the contract. Firkins did not 
rent the vehicles; renters do not have legal title signed over to them. Firkins 
substantially relied upon the oral contract to make the cash payments in order to be 
the legal title holder to the vehicles. Only later did Walter fly into town and with 
the help of Ruegner, hide the vehicles from Firkins and wash the titles through the 
California DMV. 
III. Firkins Held Legal Title to the Vehicles 
Contrary to Appellee's arguments, Firkins held title to the vehicles since 
April, 2002. (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 25,1. 24 - p. 26,1. 2). 
Firkins was able to license and obtain Utah titles for the vehicles because Walter 
mailed him the pink slip and California titles to the vehicles. (Record 335; Bench 
Trial Transcript, p. 26,11. 3-12). Walter was not listed as a lien holder on the title, 
nor did he apply to be a lien holder on the title at anytime. (Record 335; Bench 
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Trial Transcript, p. 29,11. 10-16). Firkins obtained the titles from Walter. It was 
not shown at trial that Firkins fraudulently or illegally obtained the titles. 
Appellees makes much of the fact that Firkins signed an affidavit for duplicate 
titles, however, these were only duplicates of the titles he held. He did not add his 
name to the titles, not did he forge anyone's signature. 
After the Olympics, the vehicles were stored in California, then they were 
moved to New Mexico. Before moving the vehicles to New Mexico, Firkins 
mailed Walter the titles in case a buyer may wish to purchase the vehicles. He did 
not get the titles back even though they were held in his own name. (Record 335; 
Bench Trial Transcript, p. 40,11. 20-22). At the time Firkins moved the vehicles 
back to New Mexico, he had misplaced the titles, or had lost them - he no longer 
had them in his possession. (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 41,11. 1-6). 
When back in New Mexico, Firkins applied for duplicate titles from the State of 
Utah, and then titled the vehicles in New Mexico. (Record 335; Bench Trial 
Transcript, p. 41,1. 3 - p. 43,1. 20). Walter had knowledge that the vehicles and 
Firkins were in New Mexico, however, he again never applied for or was listed as 
the lien holder on the New Mexico titles. (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 
44,11. 1-16). Therefore, the argument that Firkins held title suspiciously is 
unfounded. However, Walter washed the titles through the California DMV to 
present "clean" titles to Reugner. 
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When Walter and Ruegner met to discuss the sale of the vehicles to 
Ruegner, Walter showed Ruegner titles for the vehicles, however the titles were in 
Firkins' name. Ruegner requested Walter to produce clean titles to the vehicles. 
(Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 176,11. 6-12). The titles Walter produced 
had Firkins name on them. (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 197,11. 19-24). 
In Ruegner's presence, Walter called a locksmith to break into the vehicles because 
he didn't have keys, in an effort to repossess the vehicles. (Record 335; Bench 
Trial Transcript, p. 177,11. 20-23). Ruegner then took possession of the vehicles 
and stored them on his father's property until Walter could produce clean title. 
(Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 178,11. 6-12); (Record 335; Bench Trial 
Transcript, p. 198,11. 12-21). During this time, Ruegner was receiving phone calls 
from Firkins informing him that he (Firkins) owned the vehicles. (Record 335; 
Bench Trial Transcript, p. 199,1. 19 - p . 200,1. 12). 
While the vehicles were stored in Utah by Ruegner, Walter obtained 
California titles to the vehicles. Ruegner only moved the vehicles from his father's 
property to have them weighed. (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 201,11. 1-
9). The certification of title from the State of California stated that the vehicles 
were inspected by Ted Miller in the State of California on January 25, 2006, when 
the vehicles were actually stored on Ruegner's father's property in Utah on 
January 25, 2006. (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 201,11. 10- p. 202.1. 
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18). The application for California titles bear Firkins signature, however, Firkins 
testified that the signature was not his. (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 11 
11. 2-11); (Exhibit P 13, also attached at Addendum). California issued the titles in 
Walter's name, based upon Firkins forged signature and the fraudulent certificatioi 
by Ted Miller that the vehicles were inspected. The California titles are based on 
fraud and are void. Walter did not have proper title. 
When the titles were washed through the California DMV, there became two 
sets of titles to the same vehicles: a legal set (the New Mexico titles) and a set 
based upon a forged signature (the titles held by Ruegner from the Utah DMV). 
Curiously, Appellees make mention of a Power of Attorney, however, this 
document was not used to wash the titles through the California DMV. Firkins' 
forged signature was used to obtain the titles. The California titles are based upon 
fraud, and the New Mexico titles are based upon a clear chain of title, stemming 
from when Walter signed over title to Firkins. This evidence was not contradicted 
at trial. 
Lastly, contrary to Appellee's argument, the case of Lake Philgas is 
remarkably different than the present case. Lake Philgas Service v. Valley Bank & 
Trust Co., 845 P.2d 951, (Utah App. 1993). Unlike Lake Philgas, Firkins and 
Walter intended to transfer title, and in Lake Philgas, the seller did not forge 
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documents to obtain title to the vehicles. Therefore, Firkins held title and Walter 
had no legal standing to transfer title to Ruegner. 
IV. There was Insufficient Evidence to Support the Trial Court's 
Finding that the Vehicles in Question were Worth $100,000 at the 
Time of Conversion. 
Of the evidence presented at trial, the only concete and tangible number 
presented to determine the price is the actual sale price paid by Ruegner, $50,000. 
Although catering trucks are difficult to value, the price should be based upon a 
price determined by the market, not by speculation. Whether the amount awarded 
by the district court was supported by the evidence is a determination of fact that 
may be reversed on appeal only if clearly erroneous. Lysenko v. Sawaya, 2000 UT 
58, HI 16, 23, 7 P.3d 783. 
The testimony presented at trial shows that catering trucks can range in price 
from $40,000 to $300,000 depending on the type of appliances and other features. 
However, what is lacking is a determination of something comparable to the 
catering truck sold to Ruegner by Walter. It is unknown what type of 
specifications would cause a catering truck to be valued at $300,000 and what type 
of specifications would cause a catering truck to be valued at $40,000. Generally, 
the measure for damages in a conversion action is the value of the converted 
property at the time of conversion, plus interest. Id. at 118 (citing Broadwater v. 
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Old Republic Sur., 854 P.2d 527, 531 (Utah 1993)); Madsen v. Madsen, 72 Utah 
96, 102, 269 P. 132, 134 (1928). This measure is appropriate because the remedy 
for conversion is analogous to a forced sale of the converted property from the 
plaintiff to the defendant. See 18 Am.Jur.2d Conversion § 105 (1985). To place 
Ruegner in the same position had the tort of conversion not occurred, he would 
receive the $50,000 he gave to Walter for payment of the vehicles. Therefore, the 
appropriate amount of damages in the case would be $50,000 if Firkins is not 
deemed to be the legal title holder of the vehicles. 
V. Firkins Did Not Convert Ruegner's Property 
Firkins did not convert Ruegner's property. As stated above, Firkins had a 
valid and enforceable contract with Walter. Firkins relied upon this oral contract 
by sending cash to Walter and by holding title to the vehicles for several years. 
Therefore, Firkins had a legal and lawful justification for taking the vehicles from 
Ruegner's possession. He held valid New Mexico title to the vehicles. "A 
conversion is an act of willful interference with a chattel, done without lawful 
justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and 
possession." Jones v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2003 UT App 355, ^  9, 78 P.3d 988 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Based upon the above analysis, Firkins had 
legal right to take the vehicles from Ruegner's possession. 
VI. The Court was Correct in Not Awarding Lost Income Damages 
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The trial court was correct in not awarding lost income damages to Pig 
Boys, because at trial, the amount of potential lost income could not be 
determined. Pig Boys could not even produce evidence that would even allow for 
any approximation as to the lost income. A reasonable approximation could not be 
produced. See Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 37 P.3d 1130, 1146 (Utah 
2001). 
In the present case, Ruegner testified that Pig Boys has approximately 75% 
of the market share in Utah and he has not expanded his business outside of Salt 
Lake City. (Evidentiary Hearing, p. 91,11. 5-9). Therefore, the question becomes 
"how can Pig Boys increase their revenue and market share by adding another 
catering truck?" If Pig Boys has 75% of the market share, it would have to be 
proved at trial that with the additional catering truck he can increase his market 
share and thus increase his revenue. However, no evidence was presented at trial 
of how the second catering truck could increase Pig Boys marketing share. Pig 
Boys saturates the market with their catering services. To try to prove lost income, 
Pig Boys relied upon an expert witness, Ms. Dean. 
To calculate the amount of revenue that the second catering truck could 
produce, Ms. Dean basically took the revenue of one of Pig Boys' catering trucks 
and used the revenue generated by that one truck to predict the revenue of another 
truck. Ms. Dean assumed that Pig Boys' business depends on the number of trucks 
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they have, not how many catering jobs they have. Ms. Dean assumed that the 
market share was endless and that somehow Pig Boys could increase the market 
share to 150% from their 75%. Ms. Dean's analysis was faulty and naive. In fact, 
the court stated, "[T]he Court takes issue with her methodology, takes issue with 
her assumption and finds that based upon my analysis as to the [faulty] 
assumptions and the methodology, the Court is not convinced that her method and 
her figures are the accurate figures regarding the loss of revenue or loss of income; 
therefore the Court respectfully rejects her testimony as to potential loss of income, 
loss of revenue." (Evidentiary Hearing, p. 174,11. 9-21). The court was correct to 
not follow Ms. Dean's analysis. 
Besides Ms. Dean's analysis, Ruegner testified that while the catering truck 
was out of his control and possession, he only turned down approximately three 
catering jobs, and he did not bid on any other catering jobs. (Evidentiary Hearing, 
p. 79, 129 - 130). Therefore, it is unknown how much income Ruegner lost by not 
having the catering truck. In fact, Ruegner testified that he has seen a decline in 
his business because filming crews were choosing to film in other states and not in 
Utah. (Evidentiary Hearing, p. 90,11. 19-22). Since Defendants could not produce 
evidence at trial of what the lost income would be, the Court was correct in not 
allowing Defendants to recover loss income. However, under the damages 
analysis at trial, Pig Boys paid $50,000 for a catering truck and was compensated 
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$100,000 for the vehicle, while seeing a decline in their catering business. (It 
should be noted that Pig Boys did not request that the catering vehicle be returned, 
but allowed Firkins to keep the vehicles). In essence, Pig Boys has seen their 
investment double with the present lawsuit. 
VII. The Court was correct in Not Awarding Punitive Damages. 
The court was correct in not awarding punitive damages to Pig Boys. To 
award punitive damages, Utah courts look for egregious conduct. Mahana v. Onyx 
Acceptance Corp., 96 P.3d 893, 902 (Utah 2004). Firkins did not act in any 
egregious manner. After the vehicles he held title to since 2002 were stolen and 
secretly held on Ruegner's family property, Firkins took back the vehicles. His 
ownership interest in the vehicles were never challenged, they were just taken from 
him. Before Firkins recaptured the vehicles, Firkins notified Ruegner of his 
ownership claim several times. Firkins did not act in an egregious manner. 
CONCLUSION 
Walter and Firkins had a binding contract for the sale and purchase of the 
vehicles. The contract, when formed, consisted of an offer, an acceptance, and 
consideration. Walter and Firkins behaved per the contract for several years. 
Firkins agreed to purchase the vehicles under Walter' specific terms. Walter never 
sued Firkins for lack of payment or breach of contract. Instead, Walter took the 
vehicles by forging Firkins signature and obtaining California titles in order to sell 
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the vehicles to Ruegner. Ruegner and Pig Boys, Inc. do not have legal title to the 
vehicles. Therefore, the Court should reverse the District Court's ruling that there 
was no contract between Firkins and Walter and find that Firkins is the proper 
legal title holder and owner of the vehicles. 
Dated this \J day of February, 2009. 
01{yiaT). Uitto, Attorney for Appellant 
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